European Studies | Jiang Feng: The United States Shifts the Costs of Hegemony—Europe May Bear the Brunt

Release time:2025-03-14Number of views:11 times

Europe is currently undergoing intense upheaval brought about by the rupture of transatlantic relations. Until recently, this relationship was seen as the cornerstone of European foreign affairs and security strategy—the guarantor of European security. Some European security analysts now fearfully conclude that the United States is rapidly abandoning Europe, inflicting harm no less than that of a nuclear strike. Clearly, Europe is deeply concerned about an “American exit” and is struggling to accept being suddenly forsaken by its long-standing ally. However, Europe must calmly recognize that what the U.S. seeks to terminate is not the alliance per se, but what it perceives as Europe’s cost-free enjoyment of American hegemony—essentially, Europe “taking advantage” of the U.S. What America intends to relinquish is the cost of maintaining hegemony in Europe, not hegemony itself. The real challenge facing Europe is how to share in the global costs of American hegemony, including those in Europe.

After World War II, the U.S. constructed a vast hegemonic system composed of military security, economic finance, and political-cultural elements. Europe was the core region of this system and the frontline in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Maintaining such a hegemonic system required the U.S. not only to act as the leader of its allies, but also as the world’s policeman—at great financial cost. Over time, however, with its relative decline in power and growing national debt, the U.S. has become increasingly incapable of sustaining global hegemony. In response, it has pursued what it terms “transactional diplomacy,” aiming to shift the costs of hegemony by reducing global alliances to interest-driven bargains. Whether friend or foe, all parties are now regarded as instruments for maximizing U.S. interests and offloading hegemonic costs. This is the essence of America’s “transactional diplomacy” toward Europe.

The recent about-face in U.S. policy regarding the Russia–Ukraine conflict is a prime example of this approach. Over the past three years, at Washington’s behest, Europeans have thrown themselves into supporting Ukraine and confronting Russia, only to find themselves trapped in an unprecedented security crisis. Many failed to see that the conflict was, in essence, a proxy war orchestrated by the U.S.—not by Europe. Recently, renowned U.S. scholar Jeffrey Sachs, speaking before the European Parliament, explicitly defined the Russia–Ukraine war as a proxy conflict initiated by the U.S., rooted in Washington’s coercive diplomacy. He not only called for European strategic autonomy but also urged Europe not to view China as an enemy. The fact that Europe tolerated Prof. Sachs’ speech marked a significant step toward genuine strategic reflection.

Yet many in Europe remain unwilling to accept the proxy nature of the war or to question the reliability of U.S. security guarantees. They continue to believe that NATO is more united and resolute than ever. The reality, however, is that the three-year war of attrition has severed political, economic, and social ties between Europe and Russia, fueling unprecedented hostility and public animosity. Europe now faces long-term instability and heavy security and economic burdens. President Biden once claimed the U.S. would work with its allies to “crush Russia.” Three years later, this goal remains unfulfilled. Instead, transatlantic relations have descended into chaos. Now, the U.S. is shaking hands with Russia while leaving Europe out in the cold, turning Europe into a mere bystander—a nightmare scenario. Can such a Europe truly remain dependent on America?

In response, Europe is now determined to significantly increase military spending and bolster its defense and deterrence capabilities. Of course, this development is welcomed by the U.S., as it reduces American expenditures while increasing U.S. arms exports to Europe. As for whether Europe will truly build its own independent defense capacity, that is another question entirely—and certainly not yet part of Washington’s policy agenda. Europe is known for prolonged debates and difficult implementation. Amid the many loud calls in Brussels and major European capitals for European autonomy—even resistance to American pressure on par with that from Russia—one can still clearly hear voices like European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asserting that “the common interests of transatlantic relations outweigh the differences.”

Strangely enough,  Europe still seems uncertain whether its strategic autonomy should be anchored in Washington or Brussels. Some European political figures regard Europe’s role in supporting the United States within the context of U.S.-China strategic competition as a key component of the shared interests between Europe and the U.S. They attempt to persuade the American government to recognize Europe’s unique value in dealing with China, hoping this would convince the U.S. to remain committed to leading Europe within the transatlantic alliance and continue providing security guarantees. So far, however, the U.S. appears unresponsive. In the view of U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, Europe’s threats come not from the outside, but from within. His March 14 speech sparked anger and disappointment among Europeans.

Europe must come to the clear realization that its strategic autonomy should not be built on dependence. This means that in its foreign relations, Europe must start from its own interests, rather than letting its stance be defined by the interests of third parties—China relations included. Since 2022, the EU has aligned with the U.S. in ramping up efforts to de-risk from China and politicize trade issues, encouraging European businesses to reduce investment in China and increase investment in the U.S., under the belief that investing in America is safer. When the U.S. overtook China as Germany’s largest trading partner last year, Berlin celebrated, as if, in Europe's eyes, American investment remained the safer bet.

But the truth is plain to see: Europe’s values-based diplomacy is fundamentally at odds with America’s transactional diplomacy. Under the logic of transactional diplomacy, countries most closely tied to the U.S. in security and economic terms—as well as those rich in natural resources—are expected to shoulder a greater share of the costs of sustaining U.S. global hegemony. Europe, with its deep dependencies on the U.S. in both security and trade, and as the world’s wealthiest region, has become the prime target for this cost-shifting. To avoid the burdensome rhetoric of values diplomacy, the U.S. has explicitly dismantled the façade of the transatlantic values alliance, signaling to Europe that its relationship with the U.S. is based on price, not values—everything is weighed and judged on the scale of the dollar.

 

Author | Jiang Feng, Research Professor at Shanghai International Studies University and Chairman of the Shanghai Academy of Global Governance and Area Studies

Source | Global Times, March 14, 2025

Translated and reviewed by Zhang Yangyang with AI translator

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