The phrase a transformation unseen in a century constitutes the logical starting point for discussing China's renewal of its knowledge system about the external world in the new era. This transformation is primarily manifested in the following two aspects:

First, international disorder is unfolding at an unprecedented pace. Superficially, the long chain of interaction that Axelrod identified as fostering human cooperation—which, since the 1990s, had enabled nations to consolidate trust and strengthen collaboration through globalization—has been rapidly unraveling in recent years. Although the Cold War ended, Cold War mentality has resurfaced in the form of discourses such as systemic rivalry and institutional confrontation, fueling a growing global trust deficit. At a deeper level, the new international disorder marks the beginning of another round of global transformation. The fundamental contours of today's world were shaped by the profound changes brought about by the 19th-century global transformation, which centered on industrialization, the construction of rational nation-states, and the ideology of progress. To some extent, humanity remains trapped in an extended 19th century. However, the Western-dominated development model has now reached its limits, exposing increasingly insurmountable flaws. Industrial society is transitioning into post-industrial society, rational nation-states are being hijacked by populism and extreme nationalism, and progressive ideology is becoming increasingly polarized. From a long-term historical perspective, under the shift in momentum characterized by the East rising and the West declining, the centuries-old Western-dominated core-periphery structure is undergoing a process of decentralization.

Second, China's interactions with the world have evolved into an inverted or bidirectional impact-response model. As reform and opening-up deepened, China transformed from an object within the Western-dominated international system into a subject, from a passive recipient into an active agent, and from a participant in the so-called liberal international order into a reformer. In other words, China is shifting from internationalization—aligning with and integrating into Western standards—to globalizing Chinese solutions, promoting its own approaches based on its subjectivity and local experiences. This marks China's functional transition from actively integrating into the international system to embedding its developmental experiences within it, and now to leading global development with Chinese solutions. The natural outcome of this process is an East-West dialogue on equal footing. The historic moment has arrived where China is both capable and willing to make significant contributions to humanity.

The shift in momentum of the East rising and the West declining, the quantitative change of East-West dialogue on equal footing, and the anticipated qualitative change of reversing the West strong, East weak paradigm all demand that China develop a more comprehensive, systematic, and profound understanding of the external world. Moreover, as the world increasingly looks to China to provide alternative pathways for global governance, ensuring that Chinese solutions—more just, scientific, and reasonable—guide the world from deconstruction to reconstruction requires not only courage, responsibility, and commitment but also Chinese wisdom and foresight. If China fails to update its global knowledge and discourse systems on countries and regions in a timely and precise manner, the cost and difficulty of steadily advancing from approaching to entering the center of the world stage will significantly increase. The realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the construction of a community with a shared future for humanity depend, to a considerable extent, on our mastery of global knowledge about countries and regions.

However, compared to other major powers, China's area studies started relatively late, with weaker institutionalization and more noticeable shortcomings, leaving a significant gap with the country's current strategic needs:

1. Underemphasis on disciplinary and theoretical methods, overemphasis on specialized knowledge supply: Traditionally, area studies have largely been      consumers of theories from other disciplines rather than producers of original theories, relegating them to the role of material transporters in the knowledge production system. In discipline-centric academic research and talent cultivation systems, area studies are often dismissed as a pseudo-science — an object to be explained but without explanation—and relegated      to a marginal position. This problem persists both domestically and internationally. Compared to the West's increasing emphasis on theory and the theoretical turn in China's international relations research since the mid-to-late 1980s, China's area studies have long exhibited a considerable      disregard for theory.

2. Underemphasis on small and medium-sized countries, overfocus on major powers: In the past,      China's limited national strength meant it had diplomacy toward      major powers but not truly major-power diplomacy,      leading to a path dependency of prioritizing major powers,      neglecting small states and focusing on the core, ignoring the      periphery. Influenced by the academic system's emphasis on project      acquisition and publication in core journals, research on small and      medium-sized countries—especially small states—has been largely neglected.      Even when such research exists, these countries are often treated as      objects in great-power games rather than subjects of serious study.      Research on major powers has also long been concentrated on a few Western      developed countries like the U.S. and Europe, with limited attention to      countries such as Russia.

3. Underemphasis on      micro-level research, overemphasis on macro and strategic studies:      The academic community often views fine-grained research as a replication      of the Western-dominated fragmented knowledge production model      in China, criticizing and dismissing it from the perspective of      academic colonialism, while favoring macro-level      strategic research. The problem is that Western self-criticism      does not imply micro-level research is unimportant but rather targets the      bias toward a general lack of grand vision. As a latecomer in      global knowledge production about countries and regions, China must strike      a balance while overcoming the various shortcomings of Western-centrism.      Given the scarcity of micro-level research, it is crucial to build a      sufficiently detailed foundation of basic research, especially as China      urgently needs targeted policy designs tailored to the specific conditions      of different countries and regions.

4. Underemphasis on local      knowledge, overreliance on textualism: As a field primarily      concerned with specialized knowledge, much of China's area studies      research remains text-to-text and theory-driven, resembling plausible      conjecture rather than being substantiated by sufficient primary      materials. Some area studies experts have never visited the countries or      regions they study, lacking firsthand experience of local life and      communication. Even when field research is organized, it is often      superficial, failing to deeply integrate into local contexts or acquire      more comprehensive and reliable local knowledge, inevitably leading to      distortions in knowledge production.

5. Underemphasis on      multilingual competence, overreliance on a single foreign language:      Every language carries its own information system, knowledge preferences,      and narrative tendencies. Relying on a single language to study any      country or region locks researchers into a centrist cognitive      framework, making it difficult to objectively and accurately grasp      relevant knowledge. Multilingual competence inherently encompasses      multiple subjective ways of understanding specific countries and regions,      enabling researchers to avoid being unduly influenced by knowledge with      implicit value orientations. Generally, scholars studying a particular      country or region develop varying degrees of favoritism toward      their subject. To achieve greater objectivity, multilingualism,      multi-perspectivism, and multi-subjectivity are superior choices.

6. Underemphasis on academic      and basic research, overemphasis on policy research: Liang Qichao      once remarked, In the West, politics often follows academic thought;      in China, academic thought often follows politics. As the      learning of great powers, area studies place a heavy emphasis      on policy research, a tendency that is even more pronounced. Wang Yizhou      once wryly termed the close connection between scholars' political      influence and the impact of their ideas and social status as the      Kissinger Syndrome. Relatedly, much of China's area studies      focuses excessively on tracking and analyzing hot-button issues while      neglecting less popular but potentially long-impactful topics. For      example, scholars specializing in Afghanistan were few and far between,      yet when the U.S. withdrew its troops in 2021, countless      experts suddenly emerged to weigh in. Similarly, after the      Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in February 2022, it became a topic on      everyone's lips. It must be noted that academic research is the foundation      of policy research. Without solid basic research, so-called policy analysis      loses its grounding. Policy research rooted in scholarship and      academic research mindful of politics must not be neglected;      targeted policy recommendations must be based on rigorous academic work.

At present, amid accelerating international disorder, China is poised to become a key force shaping the world's future trajectory, a prospect that both the international community and China itself hold high expectations for. Simultaneously, China's global knowledge production about countries and regions still exhibits a dual marginality, leading to a knowledge dilemma that risks increasing the cost of its rise.

The first marginality is domestic. Within disciplinary frameworks centered on universal knowledge production, area studies—which prioritize specialized knowledge—are naturally relegated to a marginal position. Another implicit hierarchy exists within area studies, where research on major powers is privileged over research on small states, and within major-power research, studies on developed countries overshadow those on less developed ones. The common thread is a focus on resource aggregation capacity rather than genuine alignment with national strategic needs.

The second marginality is international. In the 1980s, China's research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe held significant global influence. Princeton professor Gilbert Rozman once emphasized that Chinese should be the third working language for Soviet and Eastern European studies, after English and Russian. Today, however, China's area studies lag in terms of researcher numbers, publications, and international visibility. Few institutions or individuals can engage in equal dialogue with the international academic community, and participation in top-tier global academic conferences remains low. This reflects the limited international discourse power of China's area studies.

So, how can we bridge the gap between the supply of global knowledge about countries and regions and China's growing international presence and corresponding knowledge demands? How can existing problems be resolved? How can China truly surpass the U.S. and its knowledge production model?

After the Soviet Union's collapse, amid the Cold War's end and the blind optimism of the end of history thesis, area studies fell out of favor in Western academia during the 1990s. Confident in its new empire and unipolar moment, the U.S. temporarily replaced area studies—which focus on specialized knowledge—with disciplines emphasizing universal knowledge production, as the primary driver of global political democratization and economic globalization. The rapid pace of globalization at the time also contributed to economic and political de-regionalization and de-nationalization, further diminishing the perceived value of area studies. However, the U.S. soon faced the consequences. On one hand, advancing political democratization and economic globalization without area studies expertise meant relying on a one-size-fits-all approach rather than tailored policies for each country or region, inevitably leading to setbacks. On the other hand, the 9/11 attacks served as a wake-up call, reminding the U.S. that the era of area studies was far from over. Thus, in 2014, the U.S. Department of Education announced funding for 269 university programs to strengthen area studies, cultivating experts with solid cultural knowledge and language skills covering all global regions to reinforce America's leadership in world markets, global engagement, and knowledge production.

The problem is that while the U.S. claims to treat itself as part of the world rather than an exception, and to study non-Western societies from their own perspectives, Western-centrism as a mindset and logic remains unchanged. The flaws of this knowledge production model are evident. As an emerging global power, China cannot afford to follow the U.S. path—a stance that should reflect both theoretical and cultural self-awareness. China has consistently emphasized that modernity and power centers are plural, advocating for a logic of civilizational dialogue over clash, and striving to build a better world order centered on a community with a shared future for humanity.

The recent China-centrism turn in Chinese social sciences is tied to challenging Western academic hegemony, deconstructing knowledge colonialism, and pursuing academic autonomy. As the first step in China's journey toward the center of the world stage, dispelling myths about Western academic dominance in knowledge production is entirely justified. However, to firmly enter the center and become a more successful global leader than the U.S., China must not simply replace American-centrism with China-centrism. Instead, it must establish a new knowledge production model that transcends China-centrism. Thus, China can no longer organize global knowledge production about countries and regions using a core-periphery binary as its logical starting point. Similarly, promoting a paradigm shift in area studies based on an East-West binary would at best result in historical repetition rather than genuine progress.

Amid the transformations of the new era, renewing the world knowledge system requires emphasizing China's national identity and subjectivity while embedding them within a global framework. In other words, area studies must balance a nation-state perspective with a global vision. Research subjects and researchers must be treated as equals, with the U.S. and the West regarded as interlocutors in knowledge production. A universalist logic and approach should guide the construction of a holistic knowledge system about the external world. This is the vision and ambition China's academic community should embrace.

Concretely, China's reconstruction of its global knowledge system about countries and regions could advance along the following lines:

1. Bridging the divide between      history and the present: Current area studies overemphasize present      conditions, leaving historical research on specific countries and regions      relatively marginalized. This temporal disconnect results in studies      reliant on asymmetrical literature, filled with potentially factually      skewed conjectures. Bringing history back into area studies      can provide more reliable knowledge based on historical path dependency,      lending greater insight and depth to research conclusions.

2. Covering major, medium, and      small countries, as well as diverse regions: As an emerging global      power destined to play a key role in future global governance, China must      adjust its knowledge production priorities, which have long been defined      by international power distribution and research resource availability. It      must rediscover traditionally marginalized, neglected, or forgotten      countries and regions, achieving true no blind spots, no      dead ends, and full coverage.

3. Focusing on human-centered      issues, not just abstract nations and regions or global governance:      The people-oriented approach in area studies aims to correct      the current paradigm's overemphasis on nation-states as absolute centers.      This involves two knowledge production logics: one emphasizing state      dominance, the other transcending states to focus on      supra-national and sub-national spaces and the      people within them. Both are equally important. While nation-states remain      core actors in international relations, research cannot treat them as      homogeneous, essentialized entities. Human factors must be reintegrated      into studies, transforming area studies into a warm discipline      rather than a cold art of strategy and calculation.

4. Promoting genuinely      interdisciplinary research at the methodological level: The U.S.,      for example, does not treat area studies as a discipline but      rather as an organizational form of knowledge production. Since 1947, the      mainstream approach has been to establish area studies programs or      platforms, with researchers affiliated with various disciplinary      departments. These platforms assemble expert teams for research based on      orders from state or non-state actors, dissolving after project      completion. This ad hoc academic alliance model ensures productivity while      minimizing operational costs through non-permanent staffing. However, its      drawback is the difficulty of systematizing such research, leaving it      reliant on experts' empirical, mosaic-like knowledge. China is poised to      establish area studies as a first-level discipline under interdisciplinary      studies, making disciplinary institutionalization unavoidable.

In my view, drawing on comparative politics' disciplinary construction, defining area studies by methodology is feasible: individual disciplines can conduct area studies, but interdisciplinary integration is essential. For area studies, history, geography, and anthropology are indispensable supporting disciplines, forming a time-space-humanity framework. Starting from this foundation, after internalizing history-geography-anthropology as an epistemological and methodological baseline, other disciplines can be incorporated based on research topics. With multilingual knowledge systems and multi-subjectivity, an ideal, objective, balanced, and reliable global knowledge of countries and regions can emerge.

In summary, China has reached a critical juncture in its journey to the center of the world stage, and it urgently requires a corresponding global knowledge system about countries and regions to support this transition. To address the severe mismatch between knowledge supply and demand, and to appropriately renew the world knowledge system in line with the times and China's changing international status, we must reconstruct the concepts and methods of area studies, forging our own path forward.

Author | Yang Cheng, Professor at SAGGAS, SISU

Source | 《探索与争鸣》2022年第8期