Recently, German Chancellor Merz proclaimed during the launch of the federal government's high-tech agenda that Europe must achieve technological sovereignty and cannot let the US and China alone decide the future of technology. Despite his resolute tone, his statement reflects the awkward position of Germany and Europe in the global tech competition. This new strategy, hailed by German media as a revelation agenda, appears more as a passive reaction to reality than a proactive plan for the future.
Fundamentally, the core obstacle to technological innovation in Europe and Germany is an administrative bureaucracy driven by ideological biases. Unless they break free from this management obsession, Europe's pursuit of tech sovereignty risks becoming yet another clichéd political statement. Chancellor Merz's remarks are not new; emphasizing economic and technological sovereignty to ensure secure development has become a standard talking point in German and European politics. From the rhetoric of internal party struggles during the Merkel era to Merz's repeated emphasis since taking office, the recurrence of this issue reveals a core contradiction in Europe's tech development: a serious disconnect between ambition and action.
The expectations of the economic and tech sectors have long moved beyond slogans. Data released by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research shows that Germany's R&D expenditure in 2023 accounted for 3.13% of its GDP, a record high. The EU's Horizon Europe programme budget has increased to €95.5 billion, and the European Commission's interim assessment document released in April explicitly aims to simplify procedures. By introducing a lump-sum funding mechanism, administrative costs for beneficiaries could be reduced by 14% to 30% over the project cycle. This phenomenon of prioritizing management over innovation can be described as Europe's management obsession: when a technology is still in its infancy, European policymakers are already preoccupied with how to regulate rather than how to break through.
While it is necessary to predict and manage the consequences of technological development, excessive management is like pulling up seedlings to help them grow—akin to educating a child before it is even born. Taking the AI field as an example, the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act took three years to reach a consensus and be formally introduced. The strict classification and regulation of high-risk AI have made it difficult for local European AI companies to advance. A policy research report from the European Parliament shows that in 2023, the global AI market scale exceeded €130 billion. The US led in private investment with €62.5 billion, China attracted about €7.3 billion, while the EU and UK combined attracted only €9 billion. When OpenAI in the US launched GPT-4, the EU was still debating whether generative AI required sentence-by-sentence review. When China made breakthroughs in new energy vehicle technology, Europe was discussing whether to impose additional tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. This management-first mindset essentially replaces innovation logic with administrative logic, stifling technological experimentation through risk aversion.
The history of technological development has long proven that no disruptive technology was born in a zero-risk regulatory greenhouse. Merz views China and the US as deciders of the technological future and seeks to break through by reducing dependence. This strategic judgment fundamentally deviates from the laws of technological development. The advancement of technology, especially its scientific foundation, is inevitably a product of global cooperation. Science knows no borders; while technology has national strategic attributes, it is by no means a zero-sum game. Technology and markets are inseparable—it is impossible for technology products to flow freely across borders while the technology itself remains confined within national boundaries.
Blaming China and the US for Europe's technological lag is, in fact, falling into the cognitive trap of external attribution, ignoring the fundamental role of internal causes. Historically, every breakthrough in modern technological revolutions and the international economic and trade systems they drove resulted from open cooperation. The establishment of quantum mechanics pooled the wisdom of scientists from Europe, the US, and Asia; the birth of the internet stemmed from the collaboration of a global research network; even the current AI wave is built on foundational algorithms advanced by researchers from multiple countries. If Europe attempts to enclose both science and technology within a European fortress, restricting external cooperation under the guise of security risks and tech sovereignty, it would be like cutting off the very lifeblood of technological development.
More critically, this tech decoupling mindset fundamentally conflicts with Germany's economic attributes. As an export-oriented economy, Germany's SMEs deeply rely on global supply chains, and the core technologies of its pillar industries—such as automobiles and chemicals—are deeply integrated with international markets. Forcibly reducing dependence on Chinese and American technologies would pose short-term risks of supply chain disruption and, in the long term, lead to a loss of economies of scale due to market fragmentation. Taking new energy vehicles as an example, if German automakers refuse to adopt Chinese battery technology or American autonomous driving systems, their product costs would surge, drastically reducing their competitiveness in the global market. A shrinking international market would, for an export-oriented economy like Germany, be akin to draining the pond to catch the fish.
Behind Merz's repeated emphasis on tech sovereignty lies anxiety over Europe's declining technological competitiveness and a sense of helplessness in the face of this dilemma and a rigid bureaucracy. The key to breaking the deadlock lies in escaping the management obsession mindset and returning to the fundamental laws of technological development.
First, the relationship between innovation and management must be redefined. Management should serve innovation, not the other way around. Europe should learn from the experiences of China and the US by adopting inclusive and prudent regulatory principles for emerging technologies, allowing room for experimentation within controlled parameters and establishing rules only after technologies mature.
Second, Europe must confront the reality that internal causes are fundamental. The core of Europe's technological lag is not that China and the US are too strong, but rather the weaknesses in its own innovation ecosystem: insufficient investment in basic research, low efficiency in translating research into practical applications, and inadequate venture capital support for startups. Politicians need to abandon the escapist mentality of external attribution and implement concrete measures: increase funding for basic sciences, promote joint R&D centers between universities and enterprises, and lower financing barriers for startups, allowing the market—not administrative power—to guide technological pathways.
Finally, Europe must regain the confidence to embrace open cooperation. The vast frontiers of science can accommodate global wisdom, and technological competition requires both rivalry and collaboration. If Europe, building on the Horizon Europe programme, proactively engages with China and the US in cooperative projects in areas like basic sciences and climate change, it could not only enhance its own technological capabilities but also secure a voice in global tech governance. Technological advancement must involve mutual exchange and global cooperation. Turning science and technology into a European fortress would be like shackling oneself.
From the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution to its current role as a technological follower, Europe's technological fate has always been intertwined with openness and inclusiveness. If Merz's tech sovereignty anxiety can transform into a driving force for self-renewal, it might ignite a second entrepreneurial wave in European technology, injecting vitality into the world economy—which would, of course, be good news. However, the starting point of this journey should not be to build a fortress that excludes others but to embrace a broader perspective, breaking down the self-imposed walls and embarking on a path of organic integration, healthy competition, and shared development. Only when the world develops better can Europe develop better.
Author | Jiang Feng, Research Professor at Shanghai International Studies University, Chairman of Council of Shanghai Academy of Global Governance and Area Studies
Source | Global Times, Issue 6667, 2025
Translated with AI translator
